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Patihis et al. (1994a, 1994b) found that 34% of M.A.-level psychotherapists and 23% of Ph.D.s agreed that traumatic memories recovered during hypnosis "objectively must actually have occurred" (Yapko, 1994a, p. 168) . When asked whether hypnosis can help individuals to recover memories as far back as birth, 59% of M.A.s and 48% of Ph.D.s agreed that it can. Dammeyer, Nightingale, and McCoy (1997) found that 71% of Psy.D. clinicians and 58% of Ph.D. clinicians indicated a strong belief in repressed memories, whereas only 34% of experimental psychologists did. Merckelbach and Wessel (1998) found that 94% of students and 96% of psychotherapists in The Netherlands endorsed belief in the existence of repressed memory. In 1996 , Gore-Felton et al. (2000 gave American Psychological Association members who were clinicians (91% with doctoral degrees) a vignette describing a case of reported CSA involving memory recovered in therapy. On average, the therapists indicated that CSA was "somewhat likely" in the case and that they would be "somewhat likely" to treat the client by attempting to recover memories of CSA. The latter finding suggested that beliefs can translate into therapists' treatment plans. More recently, Magnussen and Melinder (2012) surveyed licensed psychologists in Norway and found that 63% believed that recovered memories of traumatic events are real. These findings indicate a lack of skepticism about repressed memory in a large number of clinicians.
Laypersons' Beliefs
In a survey of 2,000 adult Norwegians, Magnussen et al. (2006) found that, although some laypersons' ideas about memory (e.g., memory for dramatic vs. ordinary events) were consistent with existing evidence from memory research, 45% of respondents with a college degree believed that frightening and dramatic memories can be blocked; approximately 40% of respondents with a college degree believed that people who have committed murder can repress the memory of the crime. Simons and Chabris (2011;  see also Simons & Chabris, 2012) found that 63% of the U.S. public agreed that memory works like a video camera, 48% agreed that memory is permanent, and 55% believed that memory can be enhanced through hypnosis.
In Garry, Loftus, and Brown's (1994) survey of graduate students in education, health, and nursing courses, 88% of students stated that painful experiences can be hidden in the unconscious, and 64% indicated that the hidden memories can be emotionally damaging. Similarly, Golding, Sanchez, and Sego (1996) found that many undergraduates believed in repressed memories to some degree. Students were asked to rate the accuracy of repressed memories on a scale from 1 (never accurate) to 10 (always accurate), and the mean rating was 5.6. About a quarter of the students (24%) indicated that therapists who encourage individuals to recall repressed memories use legitimate methods, and 73% believed that these therapists both use legitimate methods and implant false memories. These findings indicate that a sizable portion of the general public and students believed in repressed memory.
The Present Study
Although the research we have summarized revealed some aspects of therapists' and laypersons' beliefs about how memory works, it is not known whether beliefs about repressed memory specifically have changed markedly in key groups from the heyday of the memory wars, and if so, how. Given heightened media coverage of the potential dangers of the uncritical acceptance of repressed memory (e.g., Bikel, 1995; Hassler, 1994; Maran, 2010; Nathan, 2011) , one might predict that society as a whole, including psychologists, has become more skeptical regarding the accuracy of repressed memories.
Another gap in the literature concerns whether personality and attitudinal variables predict beliefs about memory. Are repressed-memory skeptics any different from nonskeptics in terms of intelligence, rationality, and personality? Moreover, little is known about the extent to which different groups of mental-health professionals hold different beliefs regarding memories, including recovered memories. To address these gaps in the literature, we investigated individual differences in memory beliefs in undergraduates, how undergraduates' and psychologists' current memory beliefs compare with these groups' beliefs in the 1990s, and how key groups of psychologists and other mental-health professionals vary in their views regarding repressed memory.
In Study 1, we asked undergraduates about their beliefs about memory and administered individual difference measures to ascertain the correlates of memory beliefs. In Study 2, we investigated beliefs in various groups (psychology researchers, clinical psychologists, alternative therapists, the public, and undergraduates) about the workings of memory. We did so to ascertain whether beliefs about repressed memory have changed over the past two decades. To maximize comparability with earlier results, we drew upon questions from earlier surveys.
Study 1
In our first study, we examined what undergraduates believe about how memory works and how memory beliefs are interrelated. In addition, we examined potential individual difference correlates of these beliefs. For example, we hypothesized that because people with high levels of fantasy proneness, dissociation, and absorption appear to be prone to certain false memories (e.g., ; see also Supplemental Method for Study 1 in the Supplemental Material available online), they are more inclined than others to accept the view that recovered memories are genuine and that memory is reliable and permanent. Similarly, because more empathic people are more likely to adopt other people's points of view, we predicted that empathy would be positively associated with belief in the accuracy of sincere and emotionally laden repressed-memory reports. Conversely, if one assumes that skepticism regarding repressed memory requires a combination of certain cognitive skills and exposure to memory research, then education, intelligence, and critical thinking could predict such skepticism.
Data on these and other individual differences should shed light on which characteristics predispose people to certain memory beliefs, and may provide clues to how best to disseminate memory research. For example, if people who accept unsubstantiated ideas about memory are low on a given characteristic, the dissemination of memory research could be designed so that it either does not require high levels of that skill or trait or is aimed at improving it. Participants. Undergraduates (N = 390) at the University of California, Irvine, participated in a two-session study for course credit (74.9% female, 25.1% male; mean age = 20.2 years).
Method
Materials and procedure. Participants completed individual difference (including personality) questionnaires, cognitive tasks (some not analyzed in this study), and questions about their beliefs about how memory works. (For further information on the individual difference measures, see Supplemental Method for Study 1  and Table S1 .1 in the Supplemental Material.) Several of the nine memory-belief questions were developed for the purposes of this study, and others were drawn from the literature (see Table S1 .2 in the Supplemental Material).
Results and discussion
Prevalence of beliefs. Table 1 shows the percentage of undergraduates who indicated agreement with each of eight statements about how memory works. Rates of agreement were high for two statements about repressed memory. Eighty-one percent of the undergraduates agreed to some extent that "traumatic memories are often repressed," and 70% agreed to some extent that repressed memories can be "retrieved in therapy accurately." Moreover, 86% indicated that CSA is plausible in the case of a person who has emotional problems and needs therapy even if he or she has no memory of such abuse.
Patterns of memory beliefs.
Participants' beliefs about memory fallibility tended to be interrelated to varying degrees (see Table S1 .3 in the Supplemental Material). For example, those who agreed that traumatic memories are often repressed also tended to agree that repressed memories can be retrieved in therapy and that someone can be a victim of CSA even without remembering it. An exploratory factor analysis reinforced these correlational findings, revealing one main factor and a minor factor. Factor 1 appeared to reflect belief in repressed memory and memory permanence. Factor 2 appeared to reflect beliefs regarding the unreliability and reconstructive nature of 
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Memory is constantly being reconstructed and changed every time we remember something.
90.8
Memory of everything experienced is stored permanently in brain, even if we can't access all of it.
66.7
Some people have true "photographic memories." 87.7 With effort, we can remember events back to birth.
15.1
Note: Participants responded to each statement on a fully anchored 6-point Likert scale with the following anchors: strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, agree, and strongly agree. Participants who chose slightly agree, agree, or strongly agree were counted as agreeing with a statement. memory in general (see Supplemental Results for Study 1 in the Supplemental Material for a summary of the factor analysis and how the factor composites correlated with individual differences). This finding implies that some participants concurrently believed that (a) recovered memories exist (Factor 1), but also that (b) memory can sometimes be unreliable or reconstructive (Factor 2).
Predictors of memory beliefs.
Here, we present the highlights of analyses of predictors of memory beliefs. See Tables S1.4, S1.5, and S1.6 in the Supplemental Material for summaries of the correlations of all our individual difference measures with memory beliefs.
Gender. Women were more likely than men to agree that memories are often repressed, that repressed memories can be retrieved in therapy, and that all experience is stored in memory.
Education. Participants enrolled for a greater number of years in college tended to exhibit more skeptical beliefs. Compared with students in nonpsychology majors, those in psychology-related majors agreed more that memory is unreliable and agreed less that people can remember events all the way back to birth.
Intelligence and rationality. Our proxy measure of general intelligence was total SAT score, which is highly related to general intelligence (see . Higher SAT scores predicted less agreement with statements that repressed memory can be retrieved in therapy and that some people have true photographic memories.
Critical-thinking ability ; see also Supplemental Method for Study 1 in the Supplemental Material) was significantly associated with responses to five of the nine memory-belief items. Participants who scored higher on our critical-thinking composite were less likely to agree that repressed memories can be recovered accurately in therapy and during hypnosis, that memory is photographic and permanently stored, and that memory is reliable.
Personality measures. Participants with higher scores on the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (fantasy proneness; Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001) and the Tellegen Absorption Scale disagreed more with the statement that memory is unreliable and agreed more that memory is stored permanently. Higher scores for fantasy proneness and absorption were associated with greater agreement that some people have photographic memory and that some individuals can remember events back to birth. Surprisingly, lower dissociation scores (Dissociative Experiences Scale-C; were associated with greater agreement that repressed memories can be accurately recovered in therapy or hypnosis. Empathy was the only personality measure to predict endorsement of the statement that traumatic memories are often repressed.
Conclusion. Study 1 revealed that surprisingly high percentages of undergraduates agreed with the concept of repressed memory, and this raised the question of whether there had been any change in beliefs about repressed memory over the past 2 decades. We explored this question in our next study.
Study 2
In our second study, we investigated views regarding memory repression among psychologists, the general public, and undergraduates. We compared current beliefs with past beliefs using questions from previous studies (Golding et al., 1996; Gore-Felton et al., 2000; Yapko, 1994a Yapko, , 1994b .
Method
Participants. A total of 1,376 participants completed this study's survey for course credit (undergraduates), compensation (general public), or inclusion in a cash raffle (psychologists, therapists). As shown in Table 2 , we recruited practicing psychotherapists, research psychologists, alternative therapists, undergraduate students, and individuals from the general population. Participants were recruited online through the university subject pool (undergraduates) or Amazon's Mechanical Turk (the general public) or were recruited by e-mail invitation (psychologists, life coaches, and therapists). Of those invited by e-mail, 15.5% participated fully, a rate comparable with that of other studies that have recruited participants via e-mail or listserv (e.g., 17% in Magnussen & Melinder, 2012; 13% in Wise, Safer, & Maro, 2011) . (For more details on the recruitment of participants, see Supplemental Method for Study 2 in the Supplemental Material.) Table 3 shows demographic information for the participant groups that are the focus of this article (results for the other groups are available in the Supplemental Material).
Procedure and materials.
The survey took about 20 min to complete and was conducted online at a time and place of participants' choosing. Participants rated several items from previous studies by Yapko (1994a Yapko ( , 1994b , Gore-Felton et al. (2000) , and Golding et al. (1996) . The survey also included new items, such as questions asking if, when, and why participants' beliefs about repressed memory had changed. 
Results and discussion
As in Study 1, a general pattern of intercorrelation among various memory beliefs emerged. An exploratory factor analysis revealed one main factor that could be summarized as belief in repressed memory or memory reliability. Clinical-psychology practitioners (M = 57.5, SD = 19.3) scored significantly higher than clinical-psychology researchers (M = 43.9, SD = 15.5) on this composite factor variable, t(75) = 3.37, p = .001. This difference remained significant when we controlled for gender and age in a regression model, β = 0.385, p = .010. (See Supplemental Results for Study 2 in the Supplemental Material for a summary of the factor analysis and how other groups scored on the composite factor variable.)
Comparing past and present. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of Ph.D. clinicians who agreed with the statement that hypnotically recovered memories reflect events Yapko (1994a) , are from a Ph.D. subsample (n = 208) who were recruited from psychotherapy conventions. Our data for 2011-2012 are from board-certified psychotherapists (n = 53) who were members of the American Academy of Clinical Psychology. The p values are from twoproportion z tests comparing the two groups' percentage of agreement with each of the three statements. Results for additional groups are presented in Table S2 .5 in the Supplemental Material. that actually happened was marginally lower in 2011-2012 compared with 1992 (two-sample z test, p = .059). The figure also shows that agreement that memories can be recovered as far back as birth has declined in this group over the same period (p < .001). In contrast, agreement with the statement that false memories are possible appears to have increased significantly from 1992 to 2011-2012 (p = .041). These results point to a shift toward greater skepticism regarding recovered memory over the past two decades. Figure 2 presents clinical-psychology practitioners' responses to a recovered-memory vignette. Responses in 1996-1997 indicated significantly greater likelihood that the woman in the vignette was sexually abused compared with responses in 2011-2012, t(78) = 2.97, p = .004. Compared with practitioners in 2012, practitioners in 1996-1997 reported that they would be significantly more likely to assist the woman in retrieving memories of CSA, t(665) = 4.05, p < .001; to tell her that they suspect CSA, t(665) = 4.05, p < .001; and to assist her in retrieving additional CSA memories using such techniques as hypnosis, t(665) = 2.03, p = .043. These results provide converging evidence that mainstream psychotherapists and clinical psychologists are more cautious about recovering repressed memories today compared with 20 years ago.
As shown in Figure 3 , ratings of the accuracy of repressed memories were not significantly different between undergraduates in 1995 and undergraduates in 2011, t(1013) = 1.46, p = .14. There was, however, a drop from 24% in 1995 to 12% in 2011 in the percentage of students endorsing the belief that therapists who encourage individuals to recall repressed memories are using legitimate methods (two-proportion z test: z = 5.07, p < .001). The percentage of students agreeing that such therapists implant false memories increased significantly from 3% to 6% (z = 2.33, p = .019), although the more recent percentage is still low. Therefore, like psychotherapists, undergraduates seem to show an increase in skepticism about recovering repressed memories.
Two possible confounds in the comparison of psychotherapists were age and gender. The samples from the 1990s had lower mean age compared with our sample (1992 sample: mean age = 44 years; 1996-1997 sample: mean age = 49.5 years; our 2011-2012 sample: mean age = 65.8 years, so these participants were about 46 in 1992 and 51 in 1996-1997) . Also, the 1992-1997 sample had a higher percentage of women (51%) compared with our sample (16.1%). A possible confound in the comparison of undergraduates is that the students in 1995 were from the University of Kentucky, whereas our 2011 sample was from the University of California, Irvine. These potential confounds led us to examine whether there is converging evidence that undergraduates and clinicians became more skeptical about repressed memory over time. We explored this question in our next analysis.
As mentioned earlier, we asked participants if and when their views about repressed memory had changed (see Table 4 ). The responses reinforce the possibility that clinical psychologists and undergraduates have become more skeptical of repressed memory. Of the clinical psychologists and undergraduates who indicated that their views on repressed memory had changed, most reported that they had become more skeptical about repressed memory. Therefore, the apparent increase in skepticism appears to be genuine, and not confounded by age and gender.
Comparing researchers, clinicians, and laypersons today. Table 5 shows the percentage of participants, by group, who agreed to some extent with two key statements about repressed memories (for similar patterns in responses to additional repressed-memory questions, see Tables S2.6 and S2.8 in the Supplemental Material). Less than 30% of research-oriented psychologists (experimental psychologists, members of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, members of the Society for a Science of Clinical Psychology, and clinical-psychology researchers) agreed that "traumatic memories are often repressed." In stark contrast, at least 60% of members of all other participant groups agreed with this statement. A similar pattern emerged for the statement that repressed memories can be retrieved accurately in therapy; the research-oriented groups reported less than 25% agreement, and the other groups reported at least 43% agreement. This marked split between researchers, on the one hand, and clinicians and the public, on the other, suggests that although there are indications of more skepticism today than in the 1990s, a serious divide exists between researchers and clinicians. This disjunction is clearly evident in Table 5 .
On questions of how memory works, the general public and students appear to agree more with clinicians than with memory and cognition experts (members of the Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition). Table 5 underscores the high level of belief in repressed memory among alternative therapists, the public, and undergraduates (see also Tables S2.6 and S2.8 in the Supplemental Material). These groups tended to agree with the existence of repressed memories more than did psychoanalysts. Among practitioners of alternative therapies, such as neuro-linguistic programming, Internal Family Systems therapy, and hypnosis, more than 80% of participants agreed to some extent that "traumatic memories are often repressed," and more than half agreed that "repressed memories can be retrieved in therapy accurately." 1996-1997 2011-2012 How likely is it that the client was sexually abused? How likely are you to assist the client in retrieving memories of childhood sexual abuse? How likely are you to encourage the client to seek evidence which supports a history of sexual abuse?
How likely are you to tell the client that you suspect a history of sexual abuse? How likely are you to assist the client in retrieving additional sexual abuse memories?
How Likely p = .004 p < .001 p = .60 p = .04 p < .001 In your opinion, how accurate are repressed memories? Some people feel therapists go through legitimate psychological methods to get individuals to recall repressed memories while others feel therapists implant "false" memories in their clients.
How do you feel? Golding, Sanchez, and Sego (1996; n = 609) . The data for 2011 are from the current study (n = 406). Participants first read an explanation of what a repressed memory is (see the note to Table 5 ). They then rated the accuracy of such memories on a Likert scale (1 = never accurate, 10 = always accurate) and indicated whether they believed therapists' methods for helping patients recall repressed memories are legitimate. The p values are from a t test (left graph) and two-proportion z tests (right graph). Error bars represent standard errors. Results for additional groups are presented in Table S2 .4 in the Supplemental Material. 
General Discussion
In Study 1, we found that undergraduates displayed high levels of belief in repressed memory and the possibility of accurate memory recovery in therapy. Those with more years of college education were more skeptical about repressed memory, and students in psychologyrelated majors were more likely than other students to agree that memory can be unreliable. Higher scores on our proxy measures of intelligence and rationality predicted a more skeptical pattern of beliefs. Students who scored more highly on empathy, fantasy proneness, and absorption were less skeptical about repressed memory.
In Study 2, which compared beliefs from the 1990s and 2011-2012, we found that undergraduates and mainstream psychotherapists showed increased skepticism concerning repressed memory over time. Despite this apparent attitudinal change, a large percentage of nonresearchers endorsed the validity of repressed memories, to some degree, and endorsed their therapeutic retrieval. Notably, we found a wide rift between the beliefs of psychologists with a research focus and those of practitioners and nonprofessionals.
Study 2 demonstrates a need for dissemination of the findings of memory research, and Study 1 points to individual differences that might be considered when crafting dissemination efforts. One could develop educational content that is appealing and understandable to people of varying levels of a characteristic that predicts memory beliefs (e.g., critical thinking, empathy). Also, Note: The total percentage of participants who indicated some agreement with each of the questions is highlighted in boldface. Earlier in the survey, before these items were presented, participants had been given a definition of repressed memory as "something . . . that is so shocking that the mind grabs hold of the memory and pushes it underground, into some inaccessible corner of the unconscious. There it sleeps for years, or even decades, or even forever isolated from the rest of mental life. Then, one day, it may rise up and emerge into consciousness" (Loftus, 1993, p. 518; used in Golding, Sanchez, & Sego, 1996) . The page showing these items reminded participants that repressed memory "means the person cannot remember the traumatic event due to a defense against painful content." Tables S2. research could investigate whether memory beliefs can be influenced by modifying individual difference characteristics that are relatively malleable. If so, teaching methods that target these characteristics could be implemented in parallel with dissemination of memory research. One potential methodological limitation of these studies is that participants were self-selected. It is possible that people who did not respond to requests to complete the survey hold different beliefs about memory than those who did. Given our main results, the largest concern would be that repressed-memory skeptics might have been most likely to volunteer in the research-related groups, and nonskeptics might have been most likely to volunteer in the groups containing practitioners. Nevertheless, the possibility of this pattern occurring simultaneously across the multiple and diverse professional groups we measured seems unlikely. A related potential limitation is the possibility of differences in the types of psychotherapists, undergraduates, or both, in the samples over time. Nevertheless, we found comparable changes in skepticism over time across multiple items and groups (i.e., two independent groups of Ph.D. psychologists and a group of undergraduates). Moreover, most psychologists and undergraduates who said they had changed their beliefs about repressed memory reported shifts toward increased skepticism. Finally, a limitation of our analysis of individual difference predictors of memory beliefs in Study 1 is that undetected third variables could have been responsible for the associations.
The scientist-practitioner gap (Lilienfeld, Ritschel, Lynn, Cautin, & Latzman, in press; Tavris, 2003 ) is a concern in any discipline that focuses on the treatment of clients. At least some of the sharp differences in memory beliefs that we identified may be both an effect and a cause of the broader scientist-practitioner gap in mental health. Indeed, survey data suggest that many practitioners rate clinical experience, intuition, and consistency of clinical observations with their theoretical orientation as more important than published research in informing their treatment decisions (Pignotti & Thyer, 2012; Stewart & Chambless, 2007; von Ransom & Robinson, 2006) .
One potential remedy for narrowing the gap between researchers and practitioners in their memory beliefs is to encourage a dialogue between these groups. Nevertheless, this approach may have its limits, especially given that some clinicians and researchers may disagree fundamentally on what constitutes adequate "evidence" (see Lilienfeld et al., in press) . Some clinicians may view highly confident self-reports of memory recovery as prima facie evidence for the accuracy of repressed memories, whereas most researchers presumably view controlled research as required for such an inference.
A potentially more fruitful long-term approach may be to focus the education of students and trainees on the science of memory, including repressed memory. In this respect, the broader dissemination of basic and applied memory research within graduate programs in clinical psychology and training programs in other mental-health professions may be a helpful step, although research will be needed to determine the effectiveness of this approach for narrowing the research-practice gap.
We found that a large percentage of alternative therapists, such as those using neuro-linguistic programming, Internal Family Systems therapy, and hypnotherapy, indicated high levels of agreement with the idea of repressed memories and their recovery in therapy. These findings suggest that the memory wars are not over. Nevertheless, these battles may now be limited largely to discrete pockets of practicing clinicians, especially those with specific theoretical views regarding the nature of memory. In particular, both Internal Family Systems therapists, who accept the view that the mind can house multiple indwelling identities, each with its own store of episodic memories, and hypnotherapists, many of whom place credence in the causal influence of unconscious memories, may be positively disposed toward the use of techniques designed to unearth ostensibly recovered recollections.
The debate regarding the existence of repressed memories and the reliability of memory can be taxing given the intense feelings, such as injustice, that are felt on both sides. Nevertheless, this issue bears important ramifications for memory research, as well as for the translation of such research into the therapy room and courtroom. In this respect, a better understanding of the nature and scope of researchers' and clinicians' differing views regarding memory is an essential first step toward narrowing the persistent scientist-practitioner gap. 
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Additional supporting information may be found at http://pss .sagepub.com/content/by/supplemental-data Brown & Ryan, 2003) , and the Tellegen Absorption Scale . We hypothesized that participants with high levels of dissociatability, fantasy proneness, and absorption, who appear to be prone to memory distortion (e.g., Ost, Granhag, Udell, & Hjelmsäter, 2008; Platt, Lacey, Iobst, & Finkelman, 1998 ) would agree more with the possibility of repressed memory recovery.
We took self-reported SATs scores as a proxy measure for intelligence, as they are highly related (r = .82) to psychometric g, general intelligence . We used selfreported college Grade Point Average (GPA) scores as a measure of academic achievement. As measures of critical thinking/rationality, we administered the Flexible Thinking Scale (FTS; Stanovich & West, 1997) . The FTS contains ten questions measuring a general tendency toward reflection, consideration of contrary evidence, ability to deal with ambiguity, and careful thought (example item: "Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than through waiting for good fortune"). We constructed a composite of 9 questions previously used to measure critical thinking skills ; but also see Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Levesque, 1986 Levesque, , 1989 Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Stanovich, 2009 ) and summed them to create a proxy measure of overall critical thinking ability. Repressed memories can be retrieved in therapy accurately .672
The memory of everything we've experienced is stored permanently in our brains, even if we can't access all of it. .567
Hypnosis can accurately retrieve memories that previously were not known to the person. .565
Traumatic memories are often repressed .521
Some people have true "photographic memories." .459
Memory can be unreliable. .620
Memory is constantly being reconstructed and changed every time we remember something. .482
How plausible do you think it is that this person is a victim of CSA, even though the person is unable to remember the abuse With effort, we can remember events back to birth. 
Correlation of Factors with Individual Differences
Correlations between Individual Differences Measures and Participants' Beliefs about How Memory Works (N = 390)
Gender Age
Year (3 item) .826 Belief in a Dangerous World (12 item) .819 Flexible Thinking (10 items)
.548 Critical Thinking (9 items) .401 Fantasy Prone (Creative Experiences Scale, CEQ; 25 items)
.729
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; 28 items)
.712 Mindfulness (MAAS; 15 item)
.878 Absorption (Tellegen Absorption Scale, TAS; 34 items)
.920
Basic Empathy Scale (20 items)
.811 Cognitive Empathy (BES; 9 items)
.700 Affective Empathy (BES; 11 items)
.809 Personality Traits (SSP; 91 items): Somatic Trait Anxiety (7 items) .693 Psychic Trait Anxiety (7 items) .744 Stress Susceptibility (7 items) .658 Lack Of Assertiveness (7 items) .698 Impulsiveness (7 items) .682 Adventure Seeking (7 items) .782 Detachment (7 items) .618 Social Desirability (7 items) .515 Embitterment (7 items) .654 Trait Irritability (7 items) .821 Mistrust (7 items) .779 Verbal Trait Aggression (7 items) .665 Physical Trait Aggression (7 items (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1) How plausible victim of CSA even though unable to remember? a -.39 *** .24 *** .09 .16 ** .14 ** .10 * .14 ** .08
(2) Traumatic memories are often repressed. b -.40 *** .01 .29 *** .15 ** .28 *** .17 *** .08
(3) Repressed memories can be retrieved in therapy accurately. Psychologists in the sample were recruited via email request. Typically this involved an initial email followed with three subsequent reminder emails for those who did not participate or did not indicate they did not want to participate. Where possible a very brief phone call followed the first email letting them know about the invitation email and study. In the case of SARMAC and SSCP only one email was sent out to members inviting them to participate. The emails included a link to the memory belief study so that participants could answer the questions at a computer of their choice.
Experimental psychologists were researchers that had an experimental focus, usually in social or cognitive psychology. These experimental psychologists were recruited by emailing some from universities in every state in the continental US. Clinical psychology researchers were similarly targeted and emailed using university websites from all over North America. Both mainstream clinicians and alternative therapists that were recruited were listed online as offering therapeutic or coaching services, and the contact information they gave was used to send open email invitations.
All general public participants were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk, an online website that paid each individual 30 cents for their completion of the study. In addition, all the non-student participants were told that participation would enter them into a raffle with prizes consisting of a top prize of $300, and two runner-up prizes of $100. These prizes were paid out after data collection ceased in June 2012 by picking winners at random from those that had participated (random.org).
Undergraduate participants were recruited via Experimetrix and were given 1/2 hour of credit for completing the memory belief questionnaire. Like other nonstudent participants, in DOI:10.1177/0956797613510718
Running head: MEMORY BELIEFS SUPP ONLINE MATERIALS DS13 Study 2 they could complete the study at a computer of their choice using a link that was sent to them.
Ethics. Permission to conduct this study was granted by the Internal Review Board at the University of California, Irvine. To maintain anonymity of the privately held beliefs expressed by participants, including potential colleagues within the field of psychology, participant names were never linked to the memory belief dataset itself. Any identifying features, such as names and email addresses, were redacted immediately after data collection was completed, and before data analysis began.
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Supplemental Results for Study 2 Factor Analysis
The scree plot shows one factor dominated, so we show a one factor analysis below. .813 If a news channel reported a story of an individual undergoing therapy who reports repressed memories, how likely would you believe this story?
KMO and Bartlett's Test
.782
Repressed memories can be retrieved in therapy accurately.
.749 If a friend currently undergoing therapy reported repressed memories of sexual abuse, and they had no such memory before therapy, how likely would you be in supporting him/her in this belief?
.745
When someone has a memory of a trauma while in hypnosis, it objectively must have occurred.
-.739
Hypnosis can accurately retrieve memories that previously were not known to the person.
.712
How likely is it that the client in this [recovered memory] case was sexually abused?
.702
Assist the client in retrieving memories of childhood sexual abuse.
.682 Assist the client in retrieving additional sexual abuse memories using techniques such as hypnosis.
.682
At times, the media has reported that the recovery of repressed traumatic memories can be unreliable and has led to the conviction of innocent individuals. Do you believe these memories were really false?
-.659
At some point in treatment, tell the client that you suspect a history of sexual abuse.
.645
Traumatic memories are often repressed.
.634 With effort, we can remember events back to birth.
.624 Hypnosis can be used to recover memories of actual events as far back as birth.
-.617 The memory of everything we've experienced is stored permanently in our brains, even if we can't access all of it.
.585
Memory can be unreliable.
-.570 The inability to recall early childhood events could signify evidence of repressed trauma.
-.529
It is possible to suggest false memories to someone who then incorporates them as true memories. .491
How plausible do you think it is that this person is a victim of childhood sexual abuse, even though the person is unable to remember the abuse? .490
Some people have true "photographic memories." .462 Memory is constantly being reconstructed and changed every time we remember something.
-.459
Encourage the client to seek evidence which supports a history of sexual abuse. How has media coverage changed your belief about the repression of traumatic memory?
Note. Note. Factor 1 is a composite measure approximating an overall set of beliefs indicating the reliability of memory in general and of repressed memories. Note that participants who did not complete all the questions in the composite were excluded, hence the N = 1136 being smaller than the total number who started the study.
Running head: MEMORY BELIEFS SUPP ONLINE MATERIALS DS17 Notes. These questions were in response to a case study that described in two paragraphs a woman with symptoms of depression and binge eating, who recently began to recall memories about a very upsetting period of being sexually molested by her father at age 2; and that prior to several weeks ago, she has never been aware of these memories. All five questions had a Likert scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = not likely at all; 5 = somewhat likely; 10 = extremely likely. a Gore- Golding et al. (1996) Note. a Likert scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = not likely at all; 5 = somewhat likely; 10 = extremely likely. b Cert = therapists that have been internally certified by The Center for Self Leadership (selfleadership.org) -an Internal Family Systems organization. c NCert = listed as an Internal Family Systems therapist by the Center for Self Leadership, but not listed as certified by their internal training program. 
Non-professionals
